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Abstract
This paper demonstrates that bilateral free trade agreements can
undermine political support for further multilateral trade liberalization. If a
bilateral trade agreement offers disproportionately large gains to key agents
in a country, then their reservation utility is raised above the multilateral free
trade level and a multilateral agreement would be blocked. Bilateral
agreements between countries with similar factor endowments are most
likely to have this effect. It also follows that bilateral free trade agreements
can never increase political support for multilateral free trade.
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A Political-Economic Analysis of Free Trade Agreements

I. Introduction
The recent pursuit of bilateral and regional trade agreements, marked most notably
by the·conclusion of the North American Free Trade Agreement and the further lowering of
trade barriers in Europe, raises questions about the wisdom of this approach to trade
liberalization. Governments have asserted that regional free trade negotiations are
compatible with the goal of multilateral trade liberalization, but others (e.g., Bhagwati
(1992)) have questioned whether regional arrangements will eventually lead to broader
liberalization. 1 If trade liberalization is to proceed in stages, a formal approach to the
process should consider the decision to liberalize at each stage and explore how the
decision to liberalize multilaterally is affected by bilateral liberalization.
Two recent papers take the extent of liberalization as exogenous and examine the
welfare consequences of varying degrees of regional trade bloc formation. Krugman
(1991a) constructs a model in which countries form symmetric trading blocs. Each country
produces a differentiated product which is demanded symmetrically by all countries.
Countries within each bloc set internal tariff levels to zero and impose a common optimal
(non-cooperative) tariff on all non-members. This external tariff is optimal in that it exploits
the trading bloc's power over world prices to maximize the member countries' welfare,
taking the behavior of other blocs as given. As one considers larger blocs, the international
market power of each bloc increases, as does the level of its optimal tariff. Simulating the
model over a range of demand parameters, Krugman finds that the number of trade blocs
yielding the lowest world welfare appears to be three. When there are three blocs, the
members of any bloc face zero tariffs on only a third of the goods they consume and face
relatively high tariffs on the rest. This result seems to reflect unfavorably on regional
1Bhagwati (1992) does not formally answer that question, but does conclude that many of the arguments in
favor of preferential arrangements are of dubious merit.
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approaches to trade liberalization. However, in an extension of this work (Krugman,
1991 b ), Krugman concludes that the symmetry in the demand structure of his earlier model
probably overstates the case against bilateralism. Noting that trading blocs tend to consist
of countries that conduct a disproportionate amount of trade with each other, Krugman
concludes that such "natural" trading blocs are on balance probably welfare enhancing.
Deardorff and Stem (1991) present a different criticism of Krugman's (1991a)
finding that bilateralism is undesirable. They argue that Krugman's differentiated-product
assumptions drive his result. They present an alternative model with an arbitrary number of
countries in which all countries produce and consume two goods. Consistent with a
Heckscher-Ohlin view of the world, countries differ in terms of their autarky prices. 2 The
countries form free trading areas in which members pl~ce zero tariffs on the goods of
fellow members and place prohibitive tariffs on the goods of non-members. A country
gains from joining a trading bloc if and only if its group contains trading partners whose
relative autarky prices are jointly different from its own. In this model, Deardorff and Stem
show it is probable that a set of bilateral agreements can capture the bulk of the potential
gains from free world trade. 3 On this basis, Deardorff and Stem conclude that regional
trading arrangements are likely to increase welfare. They recommend that the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) recognize the importance of regional
arrangements in the modem system and work to ensure their compatibility with liberal
multilateral trade.
While these papers yield insight into the welfare impact of adopting regional trading
blocs as a substitute for multilateral free trade, they do not address the central question of
whether such agreements interfere with progress on multilateral trade liberalization. There
are two readily apparent ways in which bilateral trade agreements could undermine
2In a Heckscher-Ohlin approach, the autarky price differences would be attributable solely to differences in
factor endowments. Deardorff and Stem's approach also allows for differences in technologies. This latter
possibility has no importance for the present paper.
3In fact, a country whose autarky price matched the multilateral free trade equilibrium price could enhance
its welfare by trading only with a subset of countries that had autarky prices different from its own.
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multilateral liberalization: Countries could abandon multilateralism in anticipation of future
bilateral agreements; or countries could sign bilateral agreements before a multilateral
accord is concluded and then lose the desire to pursue multilateralism further. The latter
possibility is the topic of this paper.
In fact, this paper will show that it is possible for bilateral free trade agreements to

undermine political support for multilateral free trade. This is accomplished using a political
economy approach similar to that of Mayer (1984), in which a simple majority of voters is
required to pass a proposal. Agents are presented first with a potential bilateral free trade
agreement and then with a multilateral free trade agreement. Each potential agreement offers
agents new equilibrium prices and product varieties in a trade model of the sort discussed
by Helpman and Krugman (1985). A majority of voters must support a trade agreement for
passage.
Agents have different holdings of capital and labor and thus react differently to any
given proposal. In the model, every trade agreement offers agents an increased number of
product varieties, which uniformly enhances the welfare of agents. The shifts in goods and
factor prices may be beneficial or detrimental depending on an agent's capital-labor ratio. In
this approach the voter with the median capital-labor ratio is of primary importance, since
that voter will always be in the majority on any vote.
The primacy of the median voter ensures that no proposal that diminishes the
median voter's utility can ever pass. This means, for instance, that if a multilateral free
trade proposal is not politically feasible under autarky - because the median voter and thus
at least half the populace oppose it -

then that same multilateral proposal cannot be

rendered feasible by any bilateral free trade agreement.. If the bilateral free trade agreement
is politically feasible, it will only raise the reservation utility level of the median voter to
which the multilateral proposal will be compared.
For this reason, the paper focuses on cases in which multilateral free trade is
politically feasible in autarky. The most interesting cases are those in which the median
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agent is roughly indifferent between multilateral free trade and the status quo. For the
median agent to be indifferent, multilateral free trade must offer a balance of additional
product variety (a gain) and adverse price shifts (a loss).
A bilateral free trade agreement can undermine support for multilateral free trade by
offering the median agent disproportionately large gains with relatively small losses. If
such a combination raises the utility of the median voter above the level offered by a
multilateral free trade agreement, then the multilateral agreement will no longer be politically
viable. This undermining is more likely to occur in bilateral agreements involving countries
with similar capital-labor ratios and roughly indifferent median voters. In the extreme case,
a bilateral agreement with an identical partner country would bring variety gains without
any price shifts. The remaining variety gains offered by a move from the bilateral
agreement to multilateral free trade could be insufficient to compensate the median agent for
the factor price losses, in which case the multilateral accord would be blocked.
The kinds of bilateral agreements that would do the least damage to the political
feasibility of multilateral free trade would be those which leave the median voter's utility
unchanged by combining price shifts with variety gains. This combination could be found
in partner countries with capital-labor ratios different from that of the home country. Such
agreements would also necessarily engender the most political opposition of any feasible
bilateral agreement, since they do the least to enhance the welfare of swing voters.
To develop the point about undermining, this paper begins with a two-good
Heckscher-Ohlin model. In this model there are no variety gains to trade and it is shown
that in this setting voters will never forsake multilateral free trade in favor of a bilateral free
trade agreement. If a majority of voters in one country prefer a bilateral trade agreement
with a given partner to multilateral free trade, the majority of voters in the partner country
will prefer multilateral free trade to the bilateral accord. This result follows from the strict
quasi-convexity of indirect utility as a function of the relative price; if a shift in relative
prices increases an agent's utility, a further shift in the same direction will increase utility
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even more. Bilateral free trade can preclude multilateral free trade only in the trivial case
when multilateral free trade would result in the same relative price as bilateral free trade, in
which case there would be no incentive to trade on a multilateral basis once the bilateral
agreement had been struck.
This result is reversed in the second half of the paper with a specific trade model
incorporating.increasing returns to scale and product varieties. The introduction of product
varieties allows agreements which would not be politically feasible in their absence.
Specifically, these are agreements in which the median voter in one partner country would
suffer from adverse price shifts but is compensated by increased variety gain. The
introduction of product varieties into the welfare analysis also allows agreements between
identical countries to raise the reservation utility levels in each. Thus, undermining is
possible in the latter model whereas in the former it was not.
Although specific models are used, the lesson of the paper is more general. When
agents are roughly indifferent between an initial situation and multilateral free trade and that
indifference results from a balance of gains (increased variety) and losses (adverse price
shifts), then any intermediate agreement offering disproportionately large gains will
undermine support for multilateral free trade.
The next section will present the Heckscher-Ohlin model along with the voting
procedure. The assertion that bilateral agreements cannot preclude multilateral agreements
in such a setting will then be proven. In Section 3, a specific example of a model with
differentiated products and intra-industry trade will be presented. Section 4 will contain a
proof that in this setting, bilateral agreements can undermine multilateral agreements.
Section 5 will briefly discuss the sensitivity of the results to the specific assumptions and
parameters of the models. Conclusions and implications will be presented in Section 6.
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II. Bilateral Agreements in a Heckscher-Ohlin Model
This section will consider bilateral agreements in a standard two good, two factor
Heckscher-Ohlin trade model. Let there be many countries, distinguishable only by their
fixed endowments of the two factors of production, capital (K) and labor (L). These factors
are used in the constant-returns-to-scale production of goods X and Y. The internationally
identical technologies will be assumed to be such that K is used relatively intensively in X
(and Lin Y) with no factor-intensity reversals. Perfect competition will ensure that profits
are zero.
Agents in these economies own shares of their country's capital and labor stocks. If
we denote the return to a unit of labor as wand the return to a unit of capital as r, the
income of an agent i is:
(2.1)

where Ki and Lj are the number of units owned by agent i. Agents are assumed to have
identical and homothetic preferences. Income is fully spent on goods X and Y. Arbitrarily,
let Y be the numeraire good and p the relative price of X in terms of Y.
It will be assumed throughout this paper that countries' relative endowments are
sufficiently similar that when they join together in a free trade area, bilateral or multilateral,
there is factor price equalization. 4 Within the trading area, the integrated economy that
would result from factor mobility will be achieved instead through trade flows. It is also
assumed that tariffs are either zero or prohibitive, so a country only trades with its free
trade partners.5
In this setting, when two countries with different capital-labor ratios form a free
trade area, the resulting relative price will lie between the autarky prices in the two countries
and the capital-abundant country will export X and import Y (the Heckscher-Ohlin
theorem).
4A sufficient condition for this to hold is that the endowments of all countries lie in the intersection of the
cones of diversification of the country with the highest and the country with the lowest capital-labor ratio.
5This assumption is restrictive, but the complications of tariff determination are not essential for the
paper's argument.
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When two or more countries join to form free trade areas, the resulting capital-labor
ratio of the integrated economy is likely to differ from any of the countries' autarky ratios
(unless they originally had identical capital-labor ratios). The effects of these shifts on
agents' utility can be characterized as follows:

PROPOSITION 1: The utility of an agent i, with an endowment (Li, Ki), can be depicted
as a function of KIL, the integrated economy's capital-labor ratio. This function is strictly
quasi-convex in KIL and has a unique minimum when the agent's capital-labor ratio is
equal to that of the economy.

Proof: Let H(p,Kj,Lj) represent the indirect utility of a country j where we will
initially assume there is a single agent. Woodland ( 1980) proves that

~; = V,(p,Kj'Lj )efc{p,Kj,Lj)
where V1 is the marginal utility of income, which will always be positive, and ex(p,Kj,Lj)
is defined as the excess supply of good X (production minus consumption). In autarky
equilibrium, ex(pA,Kj,Lj)=0 by definition. The Law of Comparative Advantage requires
that when p>pA country j exports good X and imports Y, so ex>0. Similarly, when p<pA it
follows that ex<0. Thus

oH
op < 0

for p<pA;

oH
op > 0

for p>pA; and

oH
op = 0

for p=pA.

In a Heckscher-Ohlin model without factor-intensity reversals, p=p(KIL) and p'<0,
since pis the price of the capital-intensive good, X. Thus we can replace pin H with KIL,
the capital-labor ratio of the broader integrated economy. It follows that His strictly quasi
convex in KIL with a unique minimum at

~=~

, the autarky capital-labor ratio.

3

Finally, it can be seen that the parallel between a country in an integrated economy
and an individual in a broader economy is exact. In both cases, an economic entity with
some fraction of the total capital and labor stock uses those endowments to maximize
utility, either through international or interpersonal trade. Therefore, we have an indirect
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utility function U(K/L,Li, Ki) for any agent i which is strictly quasi-convex in KIL with a
K Li
..
rrummum at L = Ki .

.To illustrate the proposition given above, suppose an agent has a capital-labor ratio
slightly higher than that of her country. For purposes of the agent's welfare, we can index
all possible free trade agreements by the continuum of possible capital-labor ratios that
would result. 6 As depicted in Figures 2.1 and 2.2, any trade agreements with countries less
capital-abundant than the agent's country will increase this agent's welfare by increasing
the return to capital and raising the price of good X, which would then be the export good.
Such agreements would lie to the left of the point labeled 'Autarky' in Figure 2.2. Trade
agreements which increase the integrated economy's capital-labor ratio will first hurt the
agent. Then, as the capital-labor ratio rises above the agent's own, the agent's utility will
increase. To the right of point E in Figure 2.2, this agent's utility rises above its autarky
level.

Next, we use this result to consider whether voters might ever opt for a bilateral
trade agreement instead of multilateral free trade. The following voting structure will be
assumed. Voters will be asked in a first period whether they would prefer a bilateral trade
pact to autarky. Then, in a second period, voters are offered the choice between the existing
trade regime (either autarky or bilateral free trade) and multilateral free trade.
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It is assumed that voters are fully informed about all aspects of endowments,
economies, and voting. It is also assumed that the periods are close enough together in time

6It should be noted that, as in the proof of Proposition 1, the relative price p decreases monotonically with
increases in the capital-labor ratio. I omit descriptions of most price changes in the paper because of this
immediate correspondence.
7This is not the only possible vote ordering, of course. There are permutations in which a multilateral pact
could be voted on before a bilateral offer or in which voting sequences are repeated. These permutations can
affect some of the results of this paper and I hope to explore them in later work. For this paper, though, the
voting structure is assumed to be the one described above.
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or discount rates are sufficiently low that discounting may be ignored. Thus, agents all vote
to maximize their expected utility under the final integrated trading economy. 8 Any
proposal that garners the support of a majority of voters will be enacted.
Once a free trade agreement has been approved, the participating countries retain
their rights to veto an extension of the agreement to include a new country or countries.
Thus free trade agreements are distinct from political unions. 9
While each voter has a single vote and the majority will prevail, one can predict the
outcome of any vote by considering the behavior of the voter with the median capital-labor
ratio. Suppose, for example, a trade agreement under consideration would lead to a capital
labor ratio in the resulting integrated economy which was lower than the alternative
economy-wide capital-labor ratio (either under autarky or a bilateral agreement). If this
increases the utility of the voter with the median capital-labor ratio, we can deduce from
Proposition 1 that all voters with higher capital-labor ratios than this median voter would
also gain. Together, these agents must constitute a majority, by the definition of median.
The same reasoning applies if an agreement would reduce the median voter's utility.
Therefore, agreements will be approved if and only if they enhance the welfare of all
participating countries' median voters. We will call such agreements politically feasible.
Now the major result of this section can be stated:

PROPOSITION 2: In a Heckscher-Ohlin setting, there can be no politically feasible
bilateral agreements which would supplant a politically feasible multilateral trade
agreement.

81 assume that agents vote their utility whether or not they believe their vote will decide the election,
perhaps as a civic duty. This avoids the issue of agents' expectations about other agents' voting behavior.
While that issue may be of theoretical interest, empirically one observes elections in which the winner
wins by a substantial margin.
9As an empirical basis for this assumption, it should be noted that the EC has moved the furthest toward
political union of any existing regional trade group, yet for admission of new members even the EC has
relied upon the unanimous approval of its members.
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Proof: It is useful at this stage to enhance the notation. Let us use k as generic
notation for a capital-labor ratio. Next, let k~ represent the capital-labor ratio of the median
agent in country c. Finally, let us distinguish between countries and integrated economies;
the latter can consist of a single country (autarky) or two or more countries (free trade
areas). The ratio of all the capital to all the labor in an integrated economy e will be written
as ke. Now let the function:

denote the maximum attainable utility of the median agent in country c, given the capital
labor ratio in economy e, as in Proposition 1. Although the levels of capital and labor
endowments determine utility, the ratios are sufficient to explore the welfare effects of
policy changes and thus the levels are omitted.
Consider two countries, A and B, which might pair to create a free trade area. In the
first stage of voting, voters in both countries decide whether to continue functioning in
autarky or whether to join to form a free trade area (AB). In the second stage, voters will
determine whether to maintain the outcome of the first stage or join in a multilateral free
trade area (M) including the other countries. Since we are only concerned with politically
feasible multilateral free trade agreements, we assume
Uj(kt, kM)>Uj ( k~, kj)
for each country j (i.e., all median agents prefer multilateral free trade to autarky).
Returning to the potential free trade agreement, AB, we can see that if kA= kB then
there is no basis for trade between the two countries. Therefore, let us arbitrarily say that
kA > kAB > kB . For agreement AB to pass, both countries must approve it. This requires
that
(2.2)

UA(kt, kAB)>UA ( kt, kA) and
UB(k:, kAB)>UB ( k!, kB).

Because of the strict quasi-convexity of utility functions, if condition (2.2) holds, this
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implies that the median voter in A must gain from decreases in the economy's capital-labor
ratio at kAB, while the median voter in B must gain from increases (see Figure 2.2).
Next consider the second stage of voting. The aim here is to show that there are no
sets of capital-labor ratios (for the two countries A and B and the rest of the world) such
that both A and B prefer the bilateral free trade agreement to multilateral free trade. In
relation to free trade area AB, multilateral free trade can have one of three effects:
1) Multilateral free trade could leave the integrated economy's capital-labor ratio
unchanged (kM = kAB). In this case, there is no basis for trade, so both A and B would be
indifferent.
2) Multilateral free trade could increase the integrated economy's capital-labor ratio
(kM > kAB) . In this case:

so B would approve of the change. It is possible that
UA(k~, kM)>UA ( k~, kAB)
only if kM is sufficiently greater than kA- in which case both countries would approve
the change. If

which will occur if A is capital abundant relative to the world, then A would want to block
multilateral free trade. However, Country B would foresee the result and vote against the
bilateral free trade agreement in period 1.
3) Multilateral free trade could decrease the integrated economy's capital-labor ratio
(kM < kAB). This case is simply the reverse of case 2. Country A would approve of the
change. If B would want to block multilateral free trade, A would foresee the result and
vote against the bilateral free trade agreement in period 1.
Thus, the strict quasi-convexity of utility functions guarantees that no two countries
that originally wanted multilateral free trade can establish a bilateral free trade area that both
prefer.
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This argument is demonstrated in Figure 2.3. A special case is depicted in which
the median voters in Countries A and B have the same capital-labor ratios as their countries.
These capital-labor ratios are the minima of the two utility curves. The capital-labor ratio of
a bilateral free trade area between A and B must lie between these two points. The three
cases in the proof given above correspond to situations when multilateral free trade would
result in a capital-labor ratio the same as, to the right of, or to the left of the bilateral FTA
point. In either of the latter two cases, at least one country would strictly prefer multilateral
free trade to the bilateral agreement.

Of course, if the discount rate were sufficiently high or the periods sufficiently far a
part, then it would be possible for a bilateral agreement to undermine multilateral free trade.
This is a caveat applicable to almost any sequential result. The point remains that in a
Heckscher-Ohlin setting in which voters are asked to consider both a bilateral and a
multilateral trade agreement, there cannot be coalitions of countries which would prefer the
bilateral agreement to the multilateral.
It is worth noting that bilateral agreements are feasible in this model if and only if
the capital-labor ratios of both participating countries lie on the same side of the multilateral
integrated economy's capital-labor ratio. To see how this might happen, we can return to
the example in which kA>kB. If both ratios were greater than that of the integrated economy
under multilateral free trade, it is possible that Country B would gain by both an initial
increase in the broader economy's capital-labor, and then a decrease sufficiently large that
B became relatively capital-abundant. In Figure 2.3, this situation would involve a
multilateral free trade capital-labor ratio well to the left of Country B's. The same argument
could be made if both countries were labor-abundant relative to the multilateral economy.
As shown in Proposition 2, though, these politically feasible bilateral agreements could not
preclude multilateral free trade.
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One can also readily see that a politically feasible bilateral agreement can never
increase the political feasibility of multilateral free trade. If multilateral free trade is not
politically feasible initially in a country j, Uj(l{,kM)<Uj ( kt,ki). If a bilateral free trade
agreement (ij) is politically feasible, then UjCl{, kij)>Uj ( kt, kj). By transitivity, then,
Uj(iJ0 ,kij)>Uj(kt,kM) so there would not be political support for an expansion from a
bilateral trade agreement to a multilateral trade agreement.
Finally, note that this logic of this section would also apply to political unions. A
political union between two countries would imply that majority support from the pooled
populations would be necessary for expanding the union. Under such an arrangement,
there would likely be a new median voter. However, if the voters in the two partner
countries are fully informed, they would block the bilateral political union unless they
concurred with the predictable ensuing choice on multilateral union.

Ill. A Differentiated-Product Model
In this section it will be shown that if agents value variety, the result of the previous
section can be overturned; there are bilateral trade coalitions which can supplant multilateral
free trade.
To show this, a specific differentiated-product model will be introduced, although
many of the features of the previous section's model will be retained. Again suppose an
individual country trades with an arbitrary number of partner countries. The only
differences between countries will be their endowments of the two factors of production,
capital, K, and labor, L, and the distribution of factor ownership. In all cases, each agent i
will be assumed to own one unit of labor (for simplicity) and some amount of capital, ki,
where:

14

(3.1)
Since labor ownership is assumed not to vary, ki also measures the relative wealth of an
agent.
The two factors are fully employed and receive returns per unit of w for labor and r
for capital. Thus, agent i enjoys an income of:
(3.2)

We turn now to the two sectors of production. Y will denote the economy's output
of the homogeneous product. The constant-returns production process uses factors in the
following way:

(3.3)
where all parameters are assumed to be positive andµ

E

(0,1).

The goods in the X sector are now differentiated products produced under
increasing returns to scale. For an individual variety x, the production function is:
(3.4)

x

=r

X

Lw-1))
K~1)
X
X

where parameters again are positive, 11

E

(0,1), and the returns to scale are reflected by~>

1. In equilibrium, n will denote the number of varieties in production and X will denote the
sum of output over all n varieties in an economy .10
To keep the model tractable, agents are assumed to have identical utility functions of
the following form:

lOThe results do not depend on the Cobb-Douglas form of the production functions. They do depend,
however, on the assumption of homotheticity in production.
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(3.5)

(3.6)

where D represents the consumption of an individual variety x and i indexes the varieties.
The homotheticity of (3.5) ensures that expenditure patterns will not vary as income is
redistributed or augmented. The parameter a lies in the range (0,1). The Spence-DixitStiglitz subutility function implies that individuals prefer variety and have a constant cross
price elasticity of substitution (cr) between varieties. I I
With this description of preferences in hand, we can examine producer behavior
more closely. Firms in both sectors maximize profits and, due to free entry and exit, those
profits are zero in equilibrium. Given the fixed expenditure shares that follow from Cobb
Douglas utility and production functions, we can readily derive factor demands in sector Y
as a function of parameters and factor returns:
(3.7)

4 = (1- a)(l- µ) (: K +

L) and

(3.8)

In the increasing returns sector, X, each firm must choose which variety to
produce, given the choice of other firms. For any firm, an unproduced variety will be more
profitable than an existing variety, so each firm will produce a different variety. Each firm
then maximizes profits by setting quantity to equate marginal revenue and marginal cost.
Since varieties are valued equally in consumers' utility functions, the demand curve facing
each firm is identical. In combination with identical production functions, this means that
each firm in sector X produces at an identical optimal level of output, denoted by x, and

11 An alternative assumption described by Helpman and Krugman ( 1985) is that subutility preferences are of
the Lancaster variety. In this case, consumers have an ideal variety and prefer products which are closer to
the ideal. Lancaster preferences would not fundamentally alter the results of this paper but would make the
analysis more complicated.
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sells at an identical equilibrium price. If n is sufficiently large, cr serves as a good
approximation of the elasticity of demand facing each firm. 12 With this approximation, plus
the knowledge that in equilibrium price equals average cost, plus the optimality condition
that marginal revenue must equal marginal cost, we can derive the following:
(J'

(3.9)

x= ~(o--l)

Since x is based solely on parameters, the number of firms, n, is determined by the
equality:
(3.10)

X=nx

To complete our description of factor allocation, we define Lx and Kx as the factor
demands of a given firm and then formally state the full-employment conditions for each
factor:

(3.11)
(3.12)
and then derive the following factor demands.

(3.13)

n4x=(l-7J)a(:K+L)

(3.14)

nKx = 11a(K

+; L)

We will assume, rather arbitrarily, that the differentiated product sector-is relatively
capital-intensive. This assumption is equivalent to the requirement that Tl>µ.
To complete the model, we must discuss the determination of prices in the
economy. Y is assumed to be the numeraire good. Since the price of Y must equal the
average cost, factor returns are restricted as follows:

(3.15)

wLy+rKy =l
y

12For a fuller discussion of the demand structure, see Helpman and Krugman (1985, Chapter 6). Note also
that the fixed level of firm production is a byproduct of the Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz approach. Under
Lancaster's approach, x would vary.
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As stated above, there will be a single price for the differentiated product which we
can denote as p. With this defined, we can close the model with our two expenditure share
equations:
(3.16)

Y=(l-a)(rK+wL)

(3.17)

pX= a(rK +wL)

With these equations, we can solve the model and trace all of the endogenous
variables back to parameters and factor endowments.
By substituting equilibrium values into the utility function described by (3.5) and
(3.6), we can derive an indirect utility function for an agent i:
a

(3.5')

U;

= I; (1- af-a) aa n<a-1) P-a

Recall that a.e (0, 1) and O'> 1. This more clearly demonstrates the effect of variety on
utility. It should also be noted here that Ii measures real income in terms of the
homogeneous product, Y.
Before returning to the sequential voting questions of Section 2, it is useful to
explore the effect of any free trade agreement on agents' utility. This analysis will later be
applied to the sequential choice of bilateral or multilateral trade regimes.
From Equation (3.5') the change in agent i's utility change due to a trade agreement
can be described as:
(3.18)
where 'FT' denotes values after a free trade agreement and 'AUT' denotes values in
autarky. Let us define AK as the percentage increase from an economy's capital stock to the
capital stock of the integrated economy resulting from a free trade agreement (and AL as the
percentage increase in the labor stock). In terms of the parameters of the model, the final
term of (3.18) is:
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(3.19)
Since AK and AL are always greater than zero, this "Variety" effect always exceeds one
(i.e., it has a positive effect on utility).
We can call the remaining effect on utility the "Comparative Advantage" effect. This
is the effect that would remain if cr went to oo and the differentiated product became
homogeneous. It is a specific example of the utility arguments underlying Section 2. To
explore this effect, we see that an agent's income will shift as follows:

(3 .20)

]FT

+ WFT
rAUT k, + WAUT
rFT k,

_,_ = ----~'~----=]~UT
I

I

To determine the sign of the Comparative Advantage effect, this income shift must be
combined with the price shift. Before solving the model for this combination, it is first
necessary to parameterize the shift in the economy's capital-labor ratio by the variable cp,
where cp is implicitly defined by:
KFT _

(3.21)

LFT -

(1 + AK )KAUT
(1 + AL)LAUT

KAUT

_
-

<p

LAUT

Note also that the free trade capital-labor ratio is that obtained by pooling the endowments
of the partner countries. We assume, as before, that endowments are such that the
integrated equilibrium can be replicated through trade. Therefore, cp will be greater than 1 if
a country's counterpart is relatively capital abundant and less than 1 if the counterpart is
relatively labor abundant.
We can also parameterize agent i's capital holdings by Pi, where Pi is implicitly
defined by:
(3.22)
So Pi>1 if agent i is relatively capital abundant, Pi<1 if agent i is relatively labor abundant,
and Pi=l if agent i has the same capital-labor ratio as the country.
With these parameterizations, the Comparative Advantage effect takes the following
form:
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(3.23)

where

0=

l

µ(l-a)+17a

-1

To interpret 0, note that the denominator of the fraction term can be seen as a weighted
average of the capital-intensity parameters in the two sectors. Recall also that a denotes the
utility weight on the capital-intensive differentiated product sector.
Equation (3.23) allows us to say whether the Comparative Advantage effect of an
agent's utility change is beneficial or undesirable, from the agent's viewpoint. This can be
seen to depend on the capital abundance of the agent and the capital-labor ratio of the
partner country.
Figures 3.1-3.4 depict Equation (3.23) for two values of 0. To get a better
analytical feel for the function described by Equation (3.23) we transform it with a natural
logarithm to get:

(3.24)

f( <p,p, 0) = l ~ eln <p + ln(¾ + 0)-ln(p + 0)

where f>O implies an increase in utility and f<O implies a decrease in utility due to a free
trade agreement. We then derive the following:

(3.25)

With these tools at hand, we can state a result identical to that of Section 2:

PROPOSITION 3: The median voter for a country will be the agent with the median
capital-labor ratio in that country.
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Proof: Consider a given free trade agreement characterized by cp. Consider the agent
with the median capital-labor ratio, whom we can identify as Pmedian· The change in this
agent's utility is given by Equation (3.24) as f(<p,Pmedian, 0). To explore the utility effects
for other agents we derive:

;JJ = 0(1- <p)
ap (p + cp0)(p + 0)

(3.26)

The sign of this expression depends only on whether the partner country is relatively capital
abundant (cp>l) or labor abundant (<p<l). We can thus say, in terms of the Comparative
Advantage effect, that if the partner country is relatively capital abundant, then all agents
with p > Pmedian are worse off than the median agent and all agents with p < Pmedian are
strictly better off. Since variety gains affect all voters equally, this demonstrates that the
agent with the median capital-labor ratio is the median voter.
One result follows directly:

PROPOSITION 4: When the median capital-labor ratio among voters is sufficiently close to
that of the country's capital-labor ratio, there will be political support for any free trade
agreement in that country.

Proof: Consider an agent whose median capital-labor ratio is identical to the
country's. Now consider the range of possible values for cp. When <p=Pmedian , the
comparative advantage part of utility is unchanged, as shown by Equation (3.25). That
derivative also reveals that as cp increases above 1, utility increases; as cp decreases below 1,
utility also increases. 13 Thus, Equation (3.23) ~ 1. Since Equation (3.19) is strictly greater
than 1 for any agent and any trade agreement, this means that the agent is made strictly
better off by the free trade agreement. Since Equation (3.23) is continuous for cp>O and the
variety gains are independent of p, it must be true that agents with p in some neighborhood
13 This is a re-establishment of the standard result that any two countries gain from trade when their autarky
price vectors differ.
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of 1 will gain from any free trade agreement as well. If Pmedian lies in that neighborhood of
1, then there will be political support for any free trade agreement.

In such cases, the arguments from Section 2 against a bilateral agreement
undermining a multilateral agreement will still apply. The interesting cases for analysis,
therefore, will be those in which the distribution of capital in an economy is skewed. In
fact, only half of these will be interesting. If the agent with median capital holdings has
p>1 and cp is less than 1 for all agreements under consideration (or if the median agent has
p<l and cp is greater than one) then both the Comparative Advantage effect and the Variety
effect will be positive for this agent and Proposition 2 will still apply.
So, only when the median voter is abundant in the same factor as the partner
country is there cause for concern about a bilateral trade agreement undermining a
multilateral accord. Equation (3.25) indicates that as cp moves from 1 toward Pmedian voter
the corresponding Comparative Advantage effect on the median voter's utility will become
steadily worse. After that point, the median voter gains by further movement in cp. To add
some intuition to this result, note that if <p=Pmedian voter, the median voter will have the
same capital-labor ratio as the integrated economy after a free trade agreement. If cp moves
sufficiently far past Pmedian voter, the median voter can gain from the comparative advantage
effect. However, there will always be a gain from the Variety effect. This means that, in
terms of Figure 2.2, it is now possible for trade agreements to occur in the region between
'Autarky' and 'E' if variety gains compensate for the adverse shifts in goods and factor
prices.

IV. Policy Experiments in a Differentiated-Product Model
We can now consider the implications of various specific trade agreements before
returning to the idea of a voting sequence. Consider a situation in which two countries, A
and B, have identical capital-labor ratios:
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(4.1)

[Superscripts here denote the country]. Suppose these countries have two-sector
differentiated-product economies and begin in autarky. We can consider the effects of a
bilateral accord to remove all trade barriers.
Production in the new, integrated equilibrium will be the same as if either country
had grown in size, with the endowment of each factor expanding proportionately. Goods
and factor prices will remain unchanged, while production of X and Y will increase
proportionately. For individual firms, the optimal level of output, x, will remain
unchanged. The increase in X, therefore, will come entirely from an increase in n, the
number of varieties.14
We therefore.have the following proposition:

PROPOSITION 5: A free trade agreement between two economies with equal capital-labor
ratios can win unanimous support, independent of the distribution of the factor
endowments.

Proof: The income of any agent i, with capital ki, remains unchanged by the
removal of trade barriers. Since prices do not change, the agent consumes the same
quantities of Y and X. The only difference is that agent i spreads her differentiated product
expenditures over both home and foreign varieties. By Equation (3.5'), utility increases
with n. All agents in each economy benefit from the liberalization, so under any
distribution of capital, agents would choose the free trade agreement over autarky.

14Toe result that prices remain unchanged requires only homotheticity in production. The fixed optimal
output result, as stated above, is particular to the Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz subutility assumption. With
increasing returns, if the optimal output level increased, it is possible that the relative price of the
differentiated product would fall while factor returns remained constant. This could further enhance welfare.
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We can now return to the scenario of Section 2 and ask about the results if these
countries are two among many. Consider a bilateral and then a multilateral free trade pact
offered in an exogenously determined sequence. We can ask whether an agreement
between A and B could affect the political support for a multilateral free trade pact. The
answer is stated in the following proposition:

PROPOSITION 6: An agreement between similar countries can only diminish the political
support for completing a broader agreement.

Proof: Let us say an action "diminishes political support" for a given agreement
when the action results in fewer votes in favor of an agreement and more votes against. 15
Suppose there exists an agent in Country A who would be indifferent between her autarkic
situation and her situation under multilateral free trade. This means that each side of
Equation (3.18) is equal to 1. Since variety gains are greater than 1 for all agents, an
indifferent agent must be relatively abundant in the same factor as the world and Equation
(3.23) must be less than 1. If the indifferent agent is asked to vote for or against a bilateral
free trade agreement with Country B, she will vote for it, since Bis similar and the
agreement offers painless variety gains, described by Equation (3.19). If, next, this agent
is asked to vote on a proposal to include Country C, she will vote against it. The third term
in the Equation (3.18) utility comparison will be strictly smaller while the first two terms
will be unchanged. Therefore the utility comparison for the previously indifferent agent will
now be less than 1. Because of the continuity of Equation (3.23), agents with p slightly
closer to the Country A mean would have benefited from an autarky-to-multilateral change,
but would now be hurt by the extension of a bilateral agreement to a multilateral agreement.
Therefore, support will be undermined unless there are no agents with p in the specified

l5of course, this diminution of support will be critical only when the votes in favor fall below half of the
total.
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range. Since A and B are assumed to have identical capital-labor ratios, the possibility is
equally relevant in both countries.

Note that if the median voter was either the original indifferent agent or any of the
agents whose support for a three-way accord switched, then the bilateral accord would

have precluded multilateral liberalization. For the swing voters, the pain due to the adverse
shift in factor returns was counterbalanced by the gain of more available varieties of the
differentiated product. A bilateral accord allowed these agents to capture some gains
without pain, thus upsetting the balance.
This result can be generalized beyond the case of countries with equal capital-labor
ratios. Without loss of generality, let a Home Country be capital-abundant relative to the
collected endowments of the Multilateral Free Trade area. This is the basis of Figure 4.1.

Suppose that there is initially majority support for multilateral free trade and, as
before, there is an agent who would be indifferent between autarky and multilateral free
trade. This agent's indifference curve is depicted in the figure, with the lowest dot
representing the autarky situation. While the curvature is arbitrary, decreases in cp hurt the
agent and variety gains are beneficial, so the curve slopes downward. 16 Free trade
agreements can be located as points on this map; their effect on the integrated capital-labor
ratio will determine the location on the horizontal axis and Equation (3.19) will position the
agreement with the vertical axis. Any agreement will result in an upward movement. If the
agreement is with a similar country, there will be only upward movement and no lateral
movement. As discussed above, this undermines political support for multilateral
liberalization.
16It is important to note that <p represents the capital-labor ratio for the integrated economy, i.e., the Home
Country and any countries who have signed free trade agreements with the Home Country. An agent's
indifference curve would bend back downwards if pi><f>MFf· This could have adverse effects on interim
agreements but should not affect the argument in the neighborhood of autarky. The curvature will depend at
least in part on the units for the vertical axis.
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The indifference curve depicted in Figure 4.1 for the "Indifferent agent" (who must
have p<l, incidentally) represents a political neutrality locus. Any trade agreements which
put the integrated economy at a point along this line will not alter political support for
multilateral free trade in the Home Country.
Suppose the "Second agent" in Figure 4.1 is the median voter. In this case, the area
between the two curves is a sliver of excess votes. Any move into this region results in
fewer votes for a multilateral free trade agreement, although the agreement would still pass.
Any move above the indifference curve of the median voter will be politically fatal for
multilateral free trade. We can now state the major proposition of this section:

PROPOSITION 7: No agreement involving a proper subset of countries can render
politically feasible an otherwise infeasible agreement involving the full set of countries.
However, bilateral agreements can render otherwise politically feasible multilateral
agreements infeasible.

Proof: Here we return to the notation of Proposition 2, in which kc0 represents the
capital-labor ratio of the median agent in country c and the ratio of all the capital to all the
labor in an integrated economy e will be written as ke. Let the possible values of e be: MFf
for multilateral free trade, c for autarky, and FTA for a free trade agreement involving a
subset of the countries. The utility notation must now also include n e to represent the
number of varieties in economy e. Now the utility function for an agent in country c can be
written as:

The first half of the proof mimics Section 2. Suppose that
Uc(k~,kMFT,n MFT)<Uc(k~,kc,n c).

This implies multilateral free trade is politically infeasible. An agreement involving a proper
subset of countries is politically feasible if and only if
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Uc(k~,kFTA,n FTA) ~ Uc(k~,kc,n c).
But that implies

Uc(k~,kFTA,n FTA)>Uc(k~, kMFT,n MFT).

Therefore multilateral free trade must remain infeasible, thus proving the first assertion.
Suppose next that

so multilateral free trade is initially politically feasible. If
Uc(k~,kFTA,n FTA)>Uc(k~, kMFT,n MFT)
then the subset agreement will have rendered an otherwise politically feasible multilateral
agreement infeasible. In contrast to Section 2, Proposition 5 showed that bilateral
agreements in which

Uc(k~,kFTA,nFTA)>Uc(k~, kMFT,n MFT)

are possible in the differentiated product model and feasible since the inequality can hold
for multiple members of a free trade agreement.

It is of some interest to explore how a country could avoid undermining support for

multilateral liberalization in this differentiated-product setting. One answer, of course, is to
pursue only a policy of multilateral liberalization from the start. If bilateral free trade
agreements are to be sought, though, the answer would be to pursue agreements with
countries or groups of countries with different factor endowments. If, in the case shown in
Figure 4.1, we wish to hold variety gains constant but lower cp, the Home Country needs
partner countries with less capital and more labor. 17 In fact, though, there is a tighter
requirement for preserving the feasibility of multilateral free trade:

PROPOSITION 8: To preserve the feasibility of multilateral free trade, subset agreements
must meet the requirement that

Uj(kt,kFTA,nFTA)~Uj(kt, kMFT,n MFT)

for all countries j participating in the agreement.
17Formally, this tradeoff can be derived by holding the left-hand side of Equation (4.3) constant and varying
AL and AK.
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Proof: We start by assuming the initial feasibility of multilateral free trade. If
Uj(~,kFTA,nFTA)>Uj(kt, kMFT,n MFT) for any country j that is party to a subset
agreement, then that country would block an expansion of the free trade area to include the
remaining non-member countries, since such an expansion would diminish the utility of a
majority of its voters.

This can be seen graphically in Figure 4.2, which translates Figure 4.1 into capital
labor space. In Figure 4.2, rays from the origin mark out the capital-labor ratios for the
median agent, that agent's country, and for the integrated economy offered by a multilateral
free trade agreement. The indifference curve connected to the point labeled "Country"
represents the autarky utility level of the median agent. To trace out the indifference curve,
it should be noted that moves outward along a ray are strictly welfare-enhancing (since they
represent variety gains). Less easily, one could hold variety constant and consider a change
in the economy's capital-labor ratio; a move to the southeast would decrease the ratio, for
example. The exact direction would depend on the parameters of the model. As shown, the
median agent is relatively labor-abundant and thus moves in the southeast direction are
detrimental to the agent's welfare.
In Figure 4.2, the variety gains offered by multilateral free trade more than

compensate the median agent for the adverse price shifts (I" represents a higher utility
level). The diagram is useful for contemplating any bilateral or subset agreement. Any
agreement must lie to the northeast of the point "Country", since the new integrated
economy will necessarily have more capital and labor than the median agent's country in
autarky. If it lies below the indifference curve I' it will not be politically feasible. If it lies
between the two indifference curves, it will be politically feasible, but will not block
multilateral free trade (at least in the median agent's country). If it lies beyond I", it will be
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politically feasible and will block multilateral free trade. To preserve the viability of
multilateral free trade, agreements must lie below the equivalents of curve I" for all
countries involved.

V. Comparative Statics
Ideally, one could describe in detail how the shape of indifference curves is affected
by each parameter of the model. Unfortunately, complex formulae emerge from the Cobb
Douglas framework and only some rough generalizations are possible.
The first parameter to consider is cr, the elasticity of substitution between
differentiated products. We have assumed only that cr > 1. As cr increases, differentiated
products become more substitutable and the importance of variety diminishes. In the limit,
variety plays no role and there will be no undermining of political support. A country
would liberalize if and only if the median voter would experience comparative advantage
gains -

the same result as in Section II. In Figure 4.2, indifference curves would become

rays from the origin.
The parameter a governs the weight of the differentiated product sector in the utility
function. As it increases, variety effects become more important, ceteris paribus. A higher

a will also correspond to a lower 0, given the assumption that the differentiated product
sector is relatively capital intensive. Figures 3.1-3.4 and Equation (3.23) show that a
decrease in 0 -

an increase in the average capital-intensity of the two sectors -

diminishes the importance of the Comparative Advantage effect in agents' utility. Increases
in Tl andµ will also have this effect on 0.
It is even more difficult to consider alterations in the functional form of the model.
It may be noted, though, that for two key features the model in Section ill is sufficient but
not necessary. The first feature is that any trade agreement resulted in increased varieties of
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the differentiated product available to all agents. 18 The second feature is the homotheticity
of agents' preferences. Without this, an agreement between similar countries could affect
factor returns and the sharp distinction between the Comparative Advantage effect and the
Variety effect in Section ill would be undone.

VI. Conclusion
This paper has shown that in a Heckscher-Ohlin setting it is politically impossible
for a bilateral trade agreement to supplant multilateral free trade. In contrast, it was shown
that, in a model with differentiated products and variety gains, bilateral free trade can
undermine support for multilateral free trade. Conditions were described under which this
could happen. To explain the difference, it is important to understand that the differentiated
product setting permits trade agreements which would have been politically impossible in
.· the setting of Section 2 by allowing gains through variety gains as well as price shifts. In
the Heckscher-Ohlin setting, a voter's utility depended solely on the capital-labor ratio. For
undermining to occur in the differentiated-product setting, the median voter would have to
experience lower utility under free trade in the absence of variety gains and higher or equal
utility once variety gains are taken into account.
Throughout the paper, the distribution of factors was shown to be crucial. The task
of maintaining political support for multilateral free trade when countries negotiate side
agreements in a differentiated-product setting was shown to require a clear understanding
of the political situation (i.e. factor distribution) in all participating countries as well as a
careful selection of those participating countries. The general principle emerged that the
more politically popular a bilateral agreement is, the more likely it is to undermine political
support for further multilateral liberalization.

18Helpman and Krugman (1985) discuss the intricacies of showing gains from trade in models with
increasing returns to scale in Chapter 9 of their book.
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The applicability of these results to more intricate models merits further research.
Still, the general lesson should remain: intermediate accords can upset the balance of gains
and losses offered by multilateralism and can therefore undermine political support. Only
when such balances are impossible -

as in the Heckscher-Ohlin setting-do these

concerns subside.
As stated above, all such difficulties are readily avoidable if countries are restricted
to pursuing multilateral liberalization. This is not necessarily an argument against more
lenient GATT rules of the sort endorsed by Deardorff and Stem (1991). The GATT must
accommodate the strong desires of its most powerful members if it is to survive as an
institution. Were it to veto major policy initiatives put forward by the United States or the
European Community countries, it would be more likely to come apart at the seams than to
prevail. Instead, this paper suggests that those powerful member countries might wish to
return their attentions to the task of multilateral liberalization.
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Figure 2.1

Utility

Agent's
KIL

Economy KIL

Figure 2.1 depicts the strictly quasi-convex utility of an agent with a given capital-labor ratio as a function
of the economy's capital-labor ratio, i.e. the capital-labor ratio of the entire trading region.

Figure 2.2

Utility
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Autarky

E

Economy KIL

Figure 2.2 uses the same utility curve as Figure 2.1. If this represented the median voter in a country, she
would reject trade agreements which resulted in economy capital-labor ratios in the range (Autarky, E).
Outside of that range, utility increases as the distance from Autarky increases.
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Figure 2.3
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Figure 2.3 demonstrates the impossibility of undermining in the Heckscher-Ohlin setting using a special
case. Here utility curves are shown for two agents, A and B, each of whom is assumed, for simplicity, to
have the same capital-labor ratio as their country. Also shown is the capital-labor ratio that would result in
a free trade area involving the two countries.

Figure 3.1
Theta

1
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utility ratio

20
a free trade agreement relative to before for
after
utility
e
comparative-advantag
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ratio
the
Figure 3.1 depicts
agents with p ~ 1 (relatively capital abundant) and agreements for which <p ~ 1 (a capital abundant partner
country). When the utility ratio dips below 1, an agent is worse off.
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Figure 3.2
Theta= 3

utility

20
Figure 3.2 differs from Figure 3.1 only .in the value of 0.

Figure 3.3
Theta= 1

utility

Figure 3.3 depicts the ratio of comparative-advantage utility after a free trade agreement relative to before for
agents with p :::;; 1 (relatively labor abundant) and agreements for which cp :::;; 1 (a labor abundant partner
country). When the utility ratio dips below 1, an agent is worse off.
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Figure 3.4
Theta= 3
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Figure 3.4 differs from Figure 3.3 only in the value of 0.

Figure 4.1
Indifference Map
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Figure 4.1 shows indifference curves for two agents. The vertical axis can be interpreted as
the number of available varieties or some monotonic function thereof.
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Figure 4.2
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Figure 4.2 translates Figure 4.1 into capital-labor space for an arbitrary set of endowments.
The endowments of both a median agent's country and the multilateral integrated economy
are shown along with indifference curves for the median agent. As shown the median agent
prefers multilateralism (curve I" is preferred to I' since points along it offer greater variety
at a given capital-labor ratio).

